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In this paper we define the problem and scope of data
sovereignty – the coupling of stored data authenticity
and geographical location in the cloud. Establishing
sovereignty is an especially important concern amid le-
gal and policy constraints when data and resources are
virtualized and widely distributed. We identify the key
challenges that need to be solved to achieve an effective
and un-cheatable solution as well as propose an initial
technique for data sovereignty.
1 Introduction
The exponential growth of electronic data has led pri-
vate organizations and governmental agencies with lim-
ited storage and IT resources to outsource data storage to
cloud-based service providers. Storage service providers
agree, by a service level agreement (SLA) contract, to
preserve and make data available for retrieval for some
level of durability. In addition to availability, many SLAs
also guarantee that data will be stored only at data centers
within a specific geographical region (e.g. within a state,
time zone or political boundary) for performance, regula-
tory and continuity reasons. Actually verifying that cloud
storage service providers are meeting their contractual
geographic obligations, however, is a challenging prob-
lem, and one that has emerged as a critical issue. For
example, careless or naı¨ve storage service providers may
move data, in violation of an SLA, to an overseas data
center to leverage cheaper IT costs. Such actions, how-
ever, may make data available to foreign governments
through search warrants or other legal mechanisms. A
dishonest storage provider may intentionally move data
overseas, to more easily leak information or to avoid le-
gal liability.
In this position paper, we propose the need for devel-
oping new algorithms for establishing the integrity, au-
thenticity, and geographical location of data stored in the
cloud. Of particular interest is establishing data location
at a granularity sufficient for placing it within the bor-
ders of a particular nation-state. We call this notion data
sovereignty. We desire to establish some (probabilistic)
guarantee that a provider is storing data at some expected
physical location(s) and maintain such guarantees amid
potentially dishonest providers. The problem of verify-
ing that data exists only at allowed locations—and copies
have not moved to some location that violates a policy—
is a difficult problem in general; data sovereignty pro-
vides a much weaker guarantee, but a step toward ac-
tively monitoring compliance with some SLA policies.
Within the problem of data sovereignty, key con-
cerns include developing techniques that minimize stor-
age and network (thus, economic) costs. The immense
size of digital archives, and the even larger size of the
data centers on which they reside, make linear schemes
(i.e. schemes that access every block of every file) pro-
hibitively expensive, for either an auditor or storage
provider. We posit that data sovereignty may not be
solvable using any one technology, but rather may be
achieved with a suite of existing and future tools that both
detect and deter malicious behavior. Tools like these,
which break the abstractions of the cloud to geolocate
data, may be essential in the future to gather evidence, es-
tablish compliance (or show non-compliance) with con-
tracts and laws.
2 Motivation
Most industries and governments are considering lever-
aging the scalability, cost, rapid provisioning and other
benefits of the cloud. Those that are not, are at least
considering the reality that—to enjoy new technologies,
to stay competitive, or to remain relevant—they may be
forced to follow this overwhelming technology trend and
move business into the cloud. Moving to the cloud, how-
ever, requires organizations to interact with their data at
a new level of abstraction. This comes with significant
benefits, but also some limitations.
For example, a data owner may wish to store backups
at multiple remote sites to provide resilience against nat-
ural disasters or for other continuity planning. Or, a data
owner may desire her data be located physically near her
target customers, for performance reasons. Rather than
actively monitor QoS from the perspective of those cus-
tomers, it might be more straight-forward to monitor the
data’s location. The cloud’s abstractions, however, un-
dermine the ability for a data owner to choose or control
location, outside trusting a provider to meet some agree-
ment. The US Federal Cloud Computing Strategy [12]
outlines “actively monitoring service level agreements”
and holding vendors accountable for failures as an essen-
tial part of any agency’s cloud migration strategy. Data
sovereignty protocols would provide such an active mon-
itoring tool, for detecting compliance with SLA provi-
sions concerning data geolocation.
Data sovereignty protocols may also be a complemen-
tary technology providing solutions to other data secu-
rity problems. For digital provenance, when determining
the origin and history of a digital document, one of the
most fundamental questions is: where is this data, right
now? With no reliable answer to this question at any
point in the data’s lifetime, one may never establish reli-
able provenance data.
Data sovereignty will also be beneficial to honest stor-
age service providers. Even when data sovereignty pro-
tocols come at additional cost (e.g. performance or eco-
nomic) we posit service providers may pay these costs
to establish a level of trust with their clients, to comply
with data retention legislation, or to meet new contractual
obligations and remain competitive in the marketplace.
3 The Scope of Data Sovereignty
Data sovereignty has been recognized—although, not
given a name—by cloud practitioners as a critical is-
sue [15]; however, to date, the problem has been nei-
ther solved nor even posed in the research literature. As
with any new security problem, it is important to clar-
ify what a protocol should and should not attempt to ac-
complish. We propose that a proof of data sovereignty
protocol should guarantee the possession, integrity and
location of an instance of data in large networks that are
not under an interrogator’s control (i.e. the Internet). The
data holder may act dishonestly (and possibly collude
with other parties) to falsely claim to be holding a par-
ticular piece of data at some geographic location.
We presume the adversary to any data sovereignty so-
lution is stronger than those previously considered by the
geolocation literature. Much of the work on geophysical
identification has ignored adversarial behavior: servers
generate packets or other trace evidence whose measure-
ment is presumed to reflect reality. Data sovereignty
considers a more challenging scenario, as active adver-
saries may act strategically to fool or confuse the querier.
Recent work in position-based cryptography considers a
similarly strong type of adversary—capable of breaking
nearly all previous geolocation strategies—that is able
to clone itself at multiple, specific, hidden locations [5].
Capkun et al. present a slightly weaker adversary that
is unable to locate certain landmarks (“hidden, mobile
base stations”) during the protocol, and thus unable to
execute certain attacks [4]. Although these adversarial
models were originally posed in a wireless setting, such
active adversaries are closer to those we consider for data
sovereignty, and make a good starting point for our future
analysis.
Data sovereignty cannot guarantee that additional
copies of data are not instantiated outside of a prescribed
geographic area, only that there exists at least one copy
of the data at an interrogation point. Considering adver-
saries that hold copies of the data at multiple geographic
locations is outside the scope of data sovereignty. Track-
ing all copies of data, without total control of the net-
work, is a different and very hard problem. We note that,
from an economic perspective, it may be punitively ex-
pensive for a storage service to replicate digital archives
that are large relative to existing network bandwidth, and
therefore it may be infeasible to successfully answer ran-
dom challenges on large data sets by selectively copy-
ing or distributing the archive to multiple geographically-
distant locations. The premise of data sovereignty is that
an adversary may have some incentive for re-locating its
data in breach of a contract, but storing copies at multiple
locations undermines any such motive.
4 The State of the Art
Tools to actively monitor real cloud performance or SLA
compliance—such as CloudCmp [14], SLAm [20] or
Nimsoft’s commercial monitoring service—do not yet
offer support for checking compliance with respect to
data durability or location clauses of an SLA. Most tools
do monitor certain QoS metrics potentially relevant to in-
ferring geolocation and data presence, such as up-time
and end-to-end response times. Thus, extending sup-
port to monitor data sovereignty is quite natural. A data
sovereignty protocol needs to achieve two things, simul-
taneously: (1) proof of the physical location of a server
on a network within some acceptable margin of error,
and (2) proof that a client’s data is indeed stored at this
location. We summarize applicable technologies, and de-
scribe their relationship to our problem.
Internet geolocation
Geolocation of servers on the Internet is currently
achieved through a variety of evidence-gathering prac-
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tices, including mining data from whois databases and
DNS records, using modern Internet topology tools
and through the manual inspection of Internet artifacts
(e.g. confirming a webpage is written in Chinese). These
methods provide a “best guess” based on a small con-
stellation of heuristic evidence, generously assumed to
be non-malicious. The only reliable, technical method
for bounding location on the Internet, however, is active
measurement (i.e. delay probes from known landmarks)
in conjunction with topological information (e.g. from
path probing and BGP routing views) [9, 11, 13, 17]. Es-
tablished commercial SLA monitoring services provide
natural partners for outsourcing data audits or for act-
ing as semi-trusted landmarks capable of participating in
data sovereignty protocols.
Multiple measurements mitigate variable sources of
observed delay, such as congestion, while transmission
and processing delay are assumed negligible relative to
propagation time. By using multiple landmarks with
known positions, delay measurements allow for trian-
gulation of the destination’s feasible region. However,
the correlation between delay and distance is not always
strong due to Internet peering points, topology, and layer-
2 traffic engineering [19]. In particular, Internet delays
are known to violate the triangle inequality. This is espe-
cially true considering the power of an adversarial node
against these types of measurement [8].
The network measurement problem for data
sovereignty, however, differs from general IP geo-
location in important ways. An adversary can only
increase a landmark’s observed delay, and only at the
edge. This allows an adversary to “move,” but the
attempted move’s error is constrained by the set of
available landmarks. Thus, one can prove a target
resides within some bounding area, and employ multiple
landmarks to constrain the size of that area. While
servers can pretend to be outside the bounding area, they
may never defy the speed of light to claim falsely to
be inside the bounding area (crafting delays to appear
outside these borders serves no useful purpose to our
adversary).
Provable data possession
Beyond the limitations of geolocating an IP address,
there currently exist no techniques that effectively (let
alone securely) bound the geographical location of some
data stored in the cloud. (To our knowledge no cur-
rent cloud storage providers, by themselves, provide
any technical means for proving either the authentic-
ity or the location of stored data.) A class of related
technologies—which we describe collectively as prov-
able data possession (PDP)—can be used to efficiently
audit remote data stores, without requiring the client or






Figure 1: An initial approach to data sovereignty.
however, only provides proof of the existence of data, not
its location.
Combining the concepts of PDP with Internet geolo-
cation to establish a novel data sovereignty protocol is
non-trivial and provides a new and interesting setting for
both problems. Naı¨vely composing latency-based geolo-
cation with provable data possession, i.e. applying each
technique serially and independently, provides limited
assurance. Doing so establishes only two, disconnected
facts: first, an unmodified copy of the data exists some-
where and second, the replying server exists within some
known physical boundary. We attain no strong binding
between the location and the data. In particular, the ge-
olocated server may be proxying, i.e. relaying, the PDP
challenges to some server at a different, remote location.
5 An Initial Approach
One promising strategy for building a meaningful data
sovereignty protocol is to bind network geolocation
query responses with some proof of data possession.
Among existing PDP techniques, the MAC-based PDP
scheme [10, 16] is an attractive candidate as it re-
quires no server-side computation during the protocol;
the server merely retrieves challenged blocks from stor-
age. Our initial approach therefore considers leverag-
ing a MAC-based PDP (MAC-PDP) as the interrogated
server incurs no computational delay, thereby permitting
a multilateration-style network delay measurement.
In MAC-PDP, a client breaks a file into blocks and tags
each block using a message authentication code func-
tion, such as HMAC with key k. The client stores the
blocks and tags in the cloud, retaining only k. To chal-
lenge possession, the client chooses c random indices,
and requests the corresponding blocks and tags; the au-
dit’s probabilistic guarantee is a function of c. To verify,
the client recomputes tags from the received blocks, and
compares these against the retrieved tags.
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To achieve data sovereignty, one could augment
the MAC-PDP scheme with network delay measure-
ment capabilities, quantifying the time it takes for
the server to respond to each challenge. This basic
strategy—associating data storage with a quality of ser-
vice metric—has the effect of confounding two (previ-
ously orthogonal) ideas: remote file possession and ser-
vice responsiveness. We note this may not be appropri-
ate for providers whose storage guarantees come at the
cost of variable, possibly long, access times; consider,
for example, the seek times associated with random ac-
cess using tape storage. However, imposing these addi-
tional QoS requirements on the service provider may be
acceptable in many scenarios, and is reasonable to con-
sider as an initial approach.
By combining the responses of a network delay-based
measurement geolocation protocol with a PDP response,
the objective is to provide a strong binding between net-
work location and data location. Of course, one must
avoid introducing any variable overhead to the server’s
processing of the request, so the measured latency almost
entirely reflects propagation cost. MAC-PDP allows a
single challenger to use the measured delay to calculate a
radial distance of the responder (e.g. using only the client
in Figure 1). A well placed challenger may be able to
provably place data within the continental United States,
efficiently satisfying many of the sovereignty issues ad-
dressed in Section 2.
For finer location granularity, a challenger may em-
ploy the help of friendly, semi-trusted landmarks (e.g. us-
ing all landmarks in Figure 1). Each landmark may chal-
lenge the server to respond to some subset of the c ran-
domly chosen blocks, measure the response times, then
authentically report the responses and measurements to
the client, to aid in estimating the target’s location.
As in PDP, an adversary may successfully answer
challenges, while storing only part of the file locally;
however, new soundness arguments are warranted. It
may be possible to transfer remote blocks during an au-
dit, so that a block that appears to be stored locally at
time t + 1 might not have been stored locally at time t.
This is comparable to giving a typical PDP adversary the
ability to recover deleted file blocks, at some cost. Con-
sider a simplistic model in which the server may trans-
fer one remote block during the time taken to respond
to a challenge, i.e. the number of remote blocks after t
challenges is dt = d0 − t, for t ≤ d0. For d0 = 1,
an adversary may answer an initial challenge with high
probability and, then, answer all future challenges with
absolute certainty. In general, the soundness error in this





, using c challenges for an
n-block file. Of course, an analysis that models time and
transfer costs more realistically is necessary.
The proposed approach has the advantage of requir-
ing no computation at the server and can be immediately
implemented given existing cloud infrastructure. The
scheme’s simplicity, however, comes with a relatively
high communication cost: using block size b, at least
c × b bytes must be transferred. Using more complex
techniques—e.g. simultaneous challenges, compressing
the responses using homomorphic signatures, as done by
some PDP schemes [3, 18]—seems difficult: complex
server-side operations add variance to the perceived de-
lay; treating this as error adds opportunity for mischief.
6 Discussion
Data sovereignty opens a rich, new problem space with
many open questions, each requiring further study. For
example, what is the right way to establish and position
known and trusted landmarks? Is this a role that can be
played by the government? Can competing storage ser-
vice providers be incentivized to act as landmarks for
their competitors? Can we create a web-of-trust given
some number of known (or unknown) honest landmarks?
Data sovereignty provides an explicit tool to break a
level of abstraction provided by the cloud. The idea of
having the abstraction of the cloud when we want it,
and removing it when we don’t, is a powerful one. Do-
ing it the “right way” may require significantly differ-
ent assumptions and architectures than currently exist. It
would be desirable to attain data sovereignty without im-
posing any QoS requirements, perhaps leveraging some
new assumptions. Does data sovereignty become easier
using an overlay network of trusted, fixed-position BGP
nodes to sign traffic? Can we constructively leverage
un-clonable, tamperproof devices operating on-site at
the storage service provider, binding computation, rather
than data, to a location? Ideally, establishing such an
assumption would isolate what makes data sovereignty
across the Internet “hard,” and may provide alternative
strategies for tackling the problem. While some assump-
tions may be unrealistic to deploy universally across the
Internet, it may be practical to satisfy them among the
smaller population of servers and clients for whom data
sovereignty is important.
When technical solutions fail to solve “hard” prob-
lems, legal remedies are often prescribed to discourage
malfeasance and to punish those, a posteriori, who are
discovered to have acted in bad faith. As such, there
are legitimate questions and ambiguities about the le-
gal protections available to data stored in a geography-
agnostic cloud. For example, in a recent report [15], Mi-
crosoft raises concerns that Fourth Amendment search
and seizure protections may only apply to data physi-
cally stored in the United States, belying a consumer’s
expected or inherent right to privacy.
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Indeed, there exist many laws that govern the flow
and storage of data across national borders, including
legislation governing privacy law, intellectual property
law, law enforcement regulations, e-discovery obliga-
tions and intelligence gathering regulations. In Nova
Scotia and British Columbia, most personal data held
by public bodies cannot be moved outside the borders of
Canada. Australia’s National Privacy Principle #9, con-
cerning transborder data flows, prohibits the transfer of
personal information to a foreign country unless certain
criteria are met, including the condition that the foreign
country upholds law substantially similar to the National
Privacy Principles [2]. Likewise, the EU Data Protection
Directive broadly restricts the flow of personal informa-
tion from within Europe to any country whose domestic
laws do not provide an “adequate level of protection” [1].
While the US Dept. of Commerce has organized a volun-
tary mechanism for US companies to certify compliance
with this EU directive (the US-EU Safe Harbor Princi-
ples), the sufficiency of these mechanisms has been the
subject of regular criticism [6]. In April 2010, German
data protection authorities issued a resolution requiring
extra diligence for German data exporters interacting
with US Safe Harbor-certified entities—effectively call-
ing into question the sufficiency of the Safe Harbor pro-
gram to meet EU guidelines—holding exporters liable
for lack of diligence, to face possible sanctions. Other
nations have expressed reservations about data stored
in US-based clouds falling under the jurisdiction of US
laws like the Patriot Act.
Within the US, regulations concerning data
management—including HIPAA, HITECH, GLBA,
SOX, and FISMA—do not specifically regulate the
physical location of stored data, although an organiza-
tion’s compliance and security planning may restrict
location as part of its strategy. Risk management and
data security analysis may be based on the properties
of a particular data center: safeguards at that center,
who has access, if employees hold clearances, the type
of monitoring performed by on-site security personnel,
etc. Moving data to a new location may change these
analyses, leaving customers non-compliant. Addition-
ally, organizations using remote storage for sensitive
information or intellectual property may desire those
data be stored at locations within U.S. borders to
avoid the complications of handling data breaches or
navigating legal protections (or lack thereof) in foreign
nations. While many of these issues may ultimately be
solved only by the courts or through legislation (matters
of law), data sovereignty may be a useful legal tool in
establishing meaningful evidence in future litigation
(matters of fact).
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